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ABSTRACT 
A .framework for modeling the dairy sector is developed, emphasizing the complexities unique to this 
multiproduct industry. Equilibrium conditions among competitive and joint dairy products are specified 
subject to mass balancing requirements, stable economic relationships and appropriate policy 
parameters. The model is applied to Canada incorporating the country-specific dairy policy mix. 
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SUPPORT PRICES AS POLICY TOOLS IN DAIRY INDUSTRY: 
ISSUES IN THEORETICAL MODELING 
Intricate technical and economic relationships among various dairy products pose challenges in 
modeling the dairy sector because of the possible multiple input, output and intermediate product 
combinations. Modeling is further complicated because in most major dairy producing countries, 
especially the industrialized ones, the dairy sector is characterized by pervasive government intervention. 
These policies that distort production and consumption incentives for milk, as well as its derivative 
products, have caused substantial trade conflict recently as evidenced by the role of dairy in the overall 
GATT negotiations (Premakumar et al., 1994). Therefore, models for policy evaluations not only need to 
incorporate exact technological processing and transformation constraints, but should also impose output 
and trade restrictions in congruence with the current domestic and world trade policy scenarios. 
This paper identifies several issues relating to the multiproduct market structure and how they 
should be incorporated into a macroeconomic general equilibrium model of the dairy industry that 
focuses on production, consumption and trade sectors. The next section discusses recent works in the 
dairy sector modeling and attempts to identify areas of concern. This is followed by a general conceptual 
framework for modeling the dairy industry, the primary difference from earlier work being the 
market-level disaggregation of industrial milk supply and use to the respective derivative products. This 
conceptual model is then applied to the Canadian dairy industry with the specific policy mix unique to 
that country. 
Issues in Dairy Sector Modeling 
Milk is both a final good, consumed as liquid milk, and an intermediate input in manufacturing 
the primary derivative dairy products, butter and cheese. These manufacturing processes also produce 
joint products or byproducts with economic value. Skim milk is a byproduct of butter manufacturing 
from which either NFD (nonfat dry milk, which is the dried solids-nonfat component of milk) or casein 
(protein component of the solids-nonfat) can be produced. Technical transformation coefficients 
determine how much of each of these products can be produced per unit of milk. Modeling of the dairy 
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sector for policy analysis has generally been attempted in a supply-demand equalization in standard 
econometric structural framework as well as in an optimization framework through programming 
approaches.' As pointed out by Bishop et al. (1993), both of these approaches have either been 
inadequate in their representation of reality, or were infeasible because they failed to adequately or 
appropriately incorporate the mass balancing constraints implied by these technical transformations. 
Several econometric models have been developed to study various aspects of federal regulation 
of the U.S. dairy industry. These models are generally simplified by estimating aggregate demand for 
industrial milk as a function of own price, price of substitutes for the final consumption good - generally 
oils and fats, and income (LaFrance and de Gorter, 1985; Cornick and Cox, 1990; Lin et al., 1990; Liu et 
al., 1991; Bausell et al. 1992). Implicit in the assumption about the substitutes is that the final 
consumption goods for which the industrial milk is an intermediate product are the fat derivatives, butter 
and cheese. Thus, impacts of relative price movements in butter and NFD are not explicit. Further, 
although fluid (Class I) and industrial (Class II) milk prices are differentiated, such distinction is 
achieved by an exogenous policy-determined differential or by regressing them on exogenous support 
prices. These simplifications obscure some of the important price relationships among various products. 
Since domestic policies are often instituted through support prices for milk and/or dairy products, these 
relationships may be critical for optimal policy determination. Cluff and Stonehouse ( 1989) present a 
policy model for the Canadian dairy sector similar to the quarterly model developed by Stonehouse and 
Kizito ( 1990). Their econometric structure disaggregates industrial milk demand as originating from the 
final demand for butterfat and nonfat solids. Using this model to characterize the quasi-public monopoly 
structure of the Canadian dairy industry, Stonehouse and Kizito justify the NFD surpluses arising from 
butterfat self-sufficiency policies. 
Alternative programming approaches to model the U.S. dairy industry have, in general, paid 
close attention to the multiproduct, vertically integrated nature of the industry. Chavas, Cox and Jesse 
(1993) offer a component pricing, spatial optimization model that characterizes the multiproduct nature 
of the dairy sector and maximizes overall welfare subject to the necessary technical coefficients. It is set 
as a multi-regional model, complemented by incorporating differential transshipment costs. Implicit in 
this objective function maximization approach in a spatial model is the assumption of a single decision 
1 Several national level structural models of the dairy sector have been used in the United States, some specifically developed for dairy 
policy analysis (National Economic Milk Policy Impact Simulator Model or NEMPIS, Dairy Market Policy Simulator or DaMPS, US 
Dairy Sector Simulator or USDSS and the Federal Order Simulator or FOS) and others, where the dairy sector is one component of a 
larger model system (FAPRI trade policy modeling system; USDA's Aggregate Dairy, Livestock and Poultry models under a CGE 
framework in the inventory-supply management study; and U.S. Forest Service's Impact Analysis for PI arming model or IMPLAN, 
which is really an input-output accounting matrix system incorporating dairy as one of the 3,097 industries covered). Similarly, given the 
importance of policy interventions in the other major dairy producing countries of the world, a number of models have been used to 
analyze the dairy sectors of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the European Union and Japan. 
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maker, and a notion that consensus exists on the (weighted) unit of surplus measure for aggregation 
across regions. The model is thus suitable for analyzing regional resource allocation within a country. 
Emphasis on the need to disaggregate non-fluid milk demand and to ensure consistent component 
balancing is noteworthy. 
This paper develops an econometric model to address the supply-demand equalization and price 
determination of milk and its derivatives at a national level, so that we can then identify international 
trade implications of alternative policy options. It is developed in a small country, competitive market 
framework. Policy incorporation is then illustrated for Canada, where substantial domestic support 
policies have been used and have evolved over time. The Canadian policy impacts have been closely 
studied and attempts have been made to improve synchronization and fine tuning. We focus on the 
adequacy and appropriateness of the choice of policy intervention instruments given specific national 
objectives. More specifically, Canada has had dairy producer support policies in place over the last 
several years, and has targeted to provide certain minimum income at the national level without 
overproducing butterfat in order to avoid having to subsidize butter exports. Support prices for butter and 
NFD are consistent with a predetermined price margin to the milk producer. The result has been a 
gradual increase in the subsidized NFD surplus that enters the world market and that has met with 
disapproval from other traditional exporters. Stonehouse and Kizito contend that this is inevitable due to 
the technical relationship between butter and NFD and the national objective to be self-sufficient in 
butterfat. In developing our model, we reevaluate the price policy options in order to examine the 
effectiveness of the present policies. One principal conclusion is that, while these policy instruments are 
consistent with the policy objectives, they also serve as policy tools for further fine-tuning to counter 
unintended trade surpluses without compromising domestic income and self-sufficiency policies. 
A Conceptual Framework 
The fluid milk supply is a product of the number of cows and per cow milk yield, both of which 
are modeled as behavioral functions. The number of cows responds to input-output price changes subject 
to biological constraints2 Higher milk prices, relative to feed and beef prices, could be expected to 
influence dairy herd building. On the other hand, increased beef and feed prices lead to lower female 
calf retention and earlier culling of cows. These relationships are specified in Equation 1 (Table 1 ), 
2 Herd building could be determined endogenously by incorporating the time lags between a new calf and heifer as well as between heifers 
and lactating cows. Although crucial for accurate detennination of cycles in the total milk supply, the heifers equation has been left out 
of the current model for simplicity. 
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Table 1. General dairy model structure 
A. Milk Supply & Allocation 
Cow No.: 
Milk Yields: 
Milk Production: 
Distribution: 
Price of Fluid Milk: 
Average Price of Milk 
n _ j(n Pm,, P,._,) 
I - 1-J. YE:/· 1'F:/ 
'l't = f{ 'l't-1· ~· (n,- n,_1)} 
Ym. r = nt • \Vr 
Ym,t = Y~,t + Yl;f.t 
Pft,t = apo + apt PM,t 
pF .yF + pAl . .0,1 Pm,t :::::: m,l m,l • m.t m,l 
Endogenous : nt, !fit ,ym,t ,y~,t ,Ynf,1 , Pm,r, PJ;f., and P~,t. 
B. Demand for milk and m.ilk products 
Standard Fluid Milk: d'j = f(P§,.Pk, ,. m,. t) 
Low fat Fluid Milk: 
Butter: 
Cheese: 
NFD: 
df = j(Pk,, 1• P~,,,. m,. t) 
df = f(PB,t· m,. t) 
dr = f(Pc,t· m,. t) 
di' = j(PN,t· m,, t) 
Endogenous: df, df, df, df, dlj, pg,,,,P~,,r, Pc,t, Pn,t and PN,t 
C. Trends & Technical Relationships 
Fat Content ofSt'llldard Milk: (j>, = J ( t) 
Fat in Low fat Milk: A.,= f ( t) 
Butter from Fluid Milk: BF - 1.+. '~ ) ..n ,- l'l't-A.t • u-, 
Industrial Milk Used in Butter: mBI = BM, I p 
Butter Production: B, = Bf + Bfl 
Industrial Milk Used in Cheese: me, = C, I c 
NFD Production: N, = ( m", ) • TJ 
D. Equilibrium Conditions: 
Industrial Milk Use: yM,, = mf + mf 
Fluid Milk Market Clearing: y{;;,, = d'j + df 
Butter Market Clearing: B,= df 
Cheese Market Clearing: C, = df 
NFD Market Clearing: N, = dN I 
Total Endogenous = 27 
Exogenous: PE , PF, Wr, t, ~, c, and 11 
(I) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(I 0) 
(II) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
( 16) 
(17) 
( 18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
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where the number of cows at time t (n,) is modeled as a function of own lag (n,_ 1) and the prices of milk 
(Pm, ,), beef (PE ,) and feed (PF. 1). 
Over the past several years, productivity in the dairy sector worldwide has increased multifold as 
a result of introduction of new management, veterinary and biological technologies. For example, 
artificial insemination and embryo transfer procedures, improved quality of feed, improved grasslands 
management, machine milking, and improved animal disease controls have contributed significantly to 
the rise in per cow milk production. Milk production has increased by about 22 percent in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries from 1966 to 1992 (OECD 
1993). This was achieved by a 49 percent increase in productivity, which more than offset the steady 
decline in cow numbers over this period. To capture these trends in productivity, the per cow milk yield 
equation incorporates a dependent lag variable. To account for the economic response to input/output 
prices, the milk-to-feed price ratio is also included as an explanatory variable. Change in cow numbers in 
this function is akin to the slippage argument forwarded in the Conservation Reserve Program for crops: 
accelerated culling can be expected to increase average herd yield, as low yielders are culled first. 
Conversely, herd building can occur through extended milking life as well as higher rate of heifer 
retention, both of which would lower the average yield. 
Equation 4 is the allocation identity for milk supply, distributed between fluid and industrial 
uses. The supply of each is balanced by the corresponding demand equation, as shown in the demand and 
equilibrium blocks of Table 1. Milk used for fluid consumption needs to be fresher than that used for 
industrial products, and hence, a premium is often paid for fluid grade milk (Equation 5). Average price 
paid to farmers is calculated in Equation 6 as the weighted price of fluid and manufacturing milk. 3 Note 
that the milk supply block can be solved separately from the whole system given the information on 
component prices in Equation 6. 
Since each of the dairy products has its own demand schedule that responds to changes in price, 
income and tastes and preferences, aggregating various manufactured products into one composite 
product would obscure impacts of relative price movements. In order to better understand the intricate 
technological and economic relationships among various dairy products, it is imperative to model these 
markets separately. Equations 7 through II represent the demands for standard fluid milk, low fat fluid 
milk, butter, cheese and nonfat dry milk powder (NFD). 
Tastes and preferences for dairy products have changed over time. For example, consumption 
of low fat milk has been increasing while average fat content of low fat milk has been declining. This, 
' The weighted price may include several components depending upon the pricing policies prevalent in a given country. For example, the 
U.S. blend price includes weighted average of three different prices: fluid grade (Class I), manufacturing grade used for soft products 
(Class II) and that used for hard products (Class III). 
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for butterfat output as a byproduct in the fluid industry. These dynamics are accounted for in the model by 
the trend arguments in demand equations as well as in Equations 12 and 13, which provide for time-varying 
technical relationships. Equations 14 through 18 specify the other technical relationships to impose the 
necessary mass balance, taking into account the alternative- and joint-product nature of the dairy products 
and milk allocation identities. 
Using first-order conditions from the processor's optimization problem, a priori specifications of 
price relationships among the products are derived. Given the processor's profit maximization problem, 
n, =PB.t · B'( +PN,t ·N, +Pc,t · C, -PM., ·(BJ + ~') 
where, P;,, is the price of the i '' product (i =butter, cheese, NFD and milk), the first-order conditions 
would imply:' 
(24) 
and Pc.t (25) 
Here, 8 is the butter-NFD ratio specifying the rate of change in NFD production per unit change in 
butter production. These price relationships, determined by both economic and technical forces, are crucial 
to this model. Two important points need to be made here. Prices of butter, cheese and NFD cannot be 
independently fixed by policy: if the NFD and butter price combination makes butter production more 
profitable than cheese, obviously more milk will flow into the butter industry leading to a downward 
pressure on butter and NFD prices and an upward pressure on cheese price until equity is achieved in the 
two manufacturing processes. Historical relative revenue in butter-cum-NFD versus cheese map.ufacturing 
for Canada and the United States demonstrates the stability of this relationship. Figures l and 2 represent 
the ratio of revenue from producing cheese versus the total revenue from butter and NFD per unit of milk, 
at wholesale prices. 
In Canada, where butter and NFD prices are controlled and the price of cheese is not, the data 
show that cheese price has moved to keep relative profitability very stable. The ratio, which is close to 
1.18, implies that cheese manufacturing cost per unit of milk has remained at about 18 percent higher than 
the cost ofbutter-cum-NFD manufacturing. In the United States, the ratio is less stable, but long-run 
stability is evident. The U.S. policy intervention is through administered price support for all three 
Since on a micro (single processor) level, the increased use of milk for butter should not influence the overall availability of milk and the 
increased production ofbutter should not cause any changes in cheese output or milk used for fluid, this expression can easily be derived by 
ignoring the cross-effect tenus such as (&yM, I BB.) and (OC. I BB, ). 
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products. It is suggested here that any unstable price relationship imposed exogenously will lead to only a 
short-run volatility. Perhaps the unintended surpluses and consequent CCC stock changes in the past might 
have been caused by such forced price relationships. In this respect, the Canadian policy of support prices 
for only NFD and butter, and free movement of cheese prices, appears to be a more appropriate and 
consistent policy tool. It must also be noted that such price relationships, jointly determined by technology 
and economics, will be expected to exist among the other alternative product combinations too (such as 
cheese to industrial milk, low-fat milk-cum-butter versus whole milk, casein versus NFD, whole milk 
powder versus butter and NFD, etc.). Another important point to be made here is with regard to the 
impacts of inappropriate policy price combinations. Attempts to fine tune price policies, without a clear 
understanding of the intrinsic price relationships, could lead to cyclical proliferation of these policies and 
volatility in production, consumption, stocks and trade. Given the number of pricing policies in the United 
States for various classes and subclasses of milk, and the alternative (fat-based and solid-based) methods 
suggested for milk equivalency measures, the intrinsic price relationships suggested here could provide a 
sound basis for reexamining these policies for consistency. 
The fluid milk can either be sold as the standard milk or converted into low-fat milk and butter. 
Therefore, in equilibrium, the relationship between the standard milk price and the prices oflow-fat milk 
and butter may be specified as follows: 
P'!.,.r = P~.< • 11 + PB.< . p (26) 
where, p. is the milk-to-low fat-milk conversion factor and f3 is the milk-to-butter conversion factor. 
Equation (26) thus implies that, on the margin, the revenue from standard milk should equal the revenue 
from fluid milk plus that from the butter component, per unit of milk. 
Moreover, the price of fluid milk can be determined as a weighted average of standard milk and 
low-fat milk prices: 
(27) 
The model may be closed by introducing market clearing identities for fluid milk and all other dairy 
products, for a closed economy with no stocks. Government intervention in the dairy industry is introduced 
in the following section, allowing for stocks and trade in dairy products. 
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Modeling Government Intervention and Trade 
Agricultural productivity in industrialized countries has been rising since the late 1950s, causing 
food prices to decline sharply. The rise in productivity and decline in prices of dairy products has been 
particularly pronounced, especially in industrialized countries. The yield increases in industrialized 
countries resulted in a steady decline in the number of dairy farms and farm animals. Demand increases 
for milk and other dairy products have been minimal, if not reversed, due to health concerns. The overall 
increased output has resulted in sharp declines in dairy product prices amid declining total consumption. 
Consequently, dairy farmers have experienced decreasing revenues along with increasing productivity, 
leading to extensive political pressure from this group for increased protection. Lobbying by farming 
groups as well as the government's concern for maintaining stable supplies of dairy products have 
contributed substantially to the level of assistance that dairy farmers receive in many of these countries. 
Governments in most industrialized countries intervene in the dairy product markets by guaranteeing 
purchases in order to stabilize prices. 
The U.S. government stipulates a blend price for milk producers and buys up all surpluses of 
butter, cheese and NFD at pre-specified prices. The Canadian government adjusts the support 
(guaranteed purchase) prices for butter and NFD to ensure a set target return over cost to the dairy 
farmers. Therefore, both private and government stocks add to demand for these products. The 
government requires a certain percentage of production as a backup stock with the rate contingent upon 
the current prices. If prices are high, the government holds lower stocks and if the prices are too low, 
government stocks increase to strengthen prices. Thus the government stock is a supply-reducing policy 
variable: SC1., = p1 • i, where, p1= f (P1• ,) and i refers to the three dairy products. 5 
The private sector stock demand is profit motivated. The lower the price, the larger the stock 
level for speculative motives, that is, SP1., = f (P1, SP,. ,.1 , SC1., ). Where stocks cannot be differentiated as 
government and private stocks, stock demand may be modeled as stock share, decreasing with increasing 
price, and then stock volume can be computed as an identity: SH1• , = f (P1.,) and S1. , = SH1• , • i, . 
The model can be closed by introducing trade at exogenous world prices. For example, three 
extra equations may be introduced to replace the supply-demand equilibrium conditions by allowing 
trade in dairy products (excluding milk): t 1., = i, - d',- Su where, t 1 refers to net exports of the i'' dairy 
product. However, each country has a unique set of trade policies, in general, to deter imports or aid 
exports of the surplus, and the specific policies need to be incorporated. Furthermore, GATT and other 
common policies impose restrictions on the choice or level of policy intervention for each country. 
5 For example, p; = S;G + S/ P; where, S1;, ,< 0. 
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Application to the Canadian Dairy Sector 
Since each country has a unique set of government policy instruments that affect its dairy sector, 
our general model structure needs to be adjusted accordingly. Moreover, it is imperative to incorporate 
the policy objectives as well as policy instruments into the model in a way such that the instruments 
yield the desired objective. 
Total demand for milk (Q<I) is the sum of demands for milk for fluid consumption (Q'J) and for 
industrial purposes (Q",), as shown in Figure 3. There is a premium for fluid milk over and above the 
price of industrial milk. 6 This is represented by a shifted function Q"[ to denote a price premium over 
Q"1, consistent with the notion that such a premium exists in demand but not in the supply of milk. 
{ 
pf - -4 
Premium ) 
for 1\ 
Fluid ' 
Milk \ 
P, ----
' 
' 
' 
Q' 
'' ' 
',Qct·; 
d f' 
f ' '--Q~f--?Q,..----Q*"-m-----+ QMilk 
Figure 3. Aggregate demand for milk 
Milk producers in Canada are supported by a target price (backed by butter and NFD support 
prices) as well as by a direct subsidy for each unit of milk sold. Target price is set to provide a specific 
dollar income over cost per unit of milk. This exogenous addition to producers' revenue is represented in 
the schedule Q', which is shifted upwards over the supply or marginal cost curve, as shown in Figure 4. 
(This figure is simplified to represent merely the butter production demand, and can easily be extended 
to include the other product demands.) Further, the government paid C$1.675 per kilogram of butterfat 
6 Although this is carried out as a policy price, the premium for fluid milk seems reasonable since milk sold as fluid needs to be fresher 
and produced under stricter sanitary conditions than milk for industrial purposes. This argument is also supported by milk prices that 
are set according to the uses for which it is intended. For example, while fluid milk is the costliest, milk used to manufacture butter is 
the cheapest, with milk used for cheese/ice cream, etc. falling in-between these two limits. 
II 
to producers during 1991-92, which is equivalent to C$6.03 per hectoliter of milk containing 3.6 
kilogram of butterfat (CDC 1992). This subsidy shifts the schedule Q' upwards to Q'". The government 
sets the milk production quota at Q so as to clear the milk market at the target price.' This quota can be 
shown to be consistent with (a) self-sufficient butter production achieved by the support price for butter 
and (b) free (domestic) market cheese equilibrium with restricted cheese imports. It is clear that the 
margin over cost to milk producers remains unchanged by the direct subsidy, although they gain by 
increased sales. The direct subsidy that increases producer revenue from the target price Pr toP* in 
effect lowers the cost to milk processors, and there are welfare gains to processors from the government. 
Production above quota is penalized by an over-quota levy to enable exports of unintended 
overproduction. Given the demand-supply structure of the milk market in this paper, it is evident that 
there is a supply response at margin to the world price rather than to the target price, at levels over Q. As 
in Figure 5, milk supply will be Qm, which is higher than the milk quota by the amount QQm. The 
P ~ Milk Q 
P* 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
Py -----------,-'-
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
Direct 
' ............ Subsidy 
' 
' 
' 
' ................ Ad! 
-- " Qd 
'---------Q'-------.. QMilk 
Figure 4. Target pricing for milk in Canada 
government purchases the extra milk (or dairy products) but levies a penalty on excess production, which 
effectively reduces the price paid to farmers to the world price level' Producers would receive the 
policy price Pr for the OQ amount of milk and would have to pay the levy ($L per unit) on the excess 
7 The Canadian Milk Supply Management Committee (CMSMC) sets the milk quota for each province that, in tum, distribute their shares 
among the provincial dairy farmers. The support prices for butter and NFD are set by the Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC) so that the 
milk producers would receive the target price for milk. 
8 Under the National Milk Marketing Plan (a federal~provincial agreement), milk producers assume responsibility for the costs associated 
with the exports of dairy products. These levies are collected by the Provincial Marketing Boards and are remitted to the CDC on a 
monthly basis (CDC, 1992, p. 8). Funds collected through levies are used to finance special consumption promotion programs approved 
by the CMSMC. 
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amount equivalent to the shaded area in Figure 5. However, producers would benefit from the excess 
production as long as the world prices are higher than their per unit cost of production- as represented by 
the supply curve Q'. 
Results and Discussion 
The general structure provided in the previous section, along with these policy interventions, 
were used to develop the Canadian dairy model of the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute's 
(FAPRI) modeling system. The structural coefficients were estimated block-wise using 3SLS nonlinear 
estimation, over the period 1968 to 1993. Estimation variables are defined in Table 2 and the results from 
the log-linear estimation are presented in Table 3. 
In the 29-equation system representation of the Canadian dairy sector developed here, seven 
equations are identities. The model was estimated block-wise, using 2SLS and as can be seen in Table 3, 
most of the equation specifications were validated and a vast majority of the structural parameters were 
significant. The simulation results were equally encouraging, and detailed results are available directly 
from the authors. The main contribution of this study however lies not on the significant coefficients and 
elasticities, but rather on the simple and consistent structural representation. This is useful to identify 
suitable policy options and assess their implications. Statistical significance of the coefficients and the 
model validation certainly strengthen our arguments. 
The results confirm that in this complex multiproduct sector, technical conversion factors and 
mass balancing requirements across the total input-output matrix will force certain stable price 
relationships, characteristic of the market. Technical coefficients in converting milk to its derivative 
products and the relationship among the products together with the profit maximizing conditions at 
micro level among competitive producers establish intrinsic price relationship between the alternative 
product combinations. We wish to draw two policy implications arising from this stable price 
relationships. First implications is that such intrinsic price relationships limit the available instruments 
for policy manipulation in directing the sectoral performance. As can be seen in the case of Canada 
support price announcement for butter and NFD leads to a specific price for industrial milk. Should this 
milk price be different from the target price, fine tuning can be done by adjusting either or both butter 
and NFD prices. Further, note that a support price for cheese is not announced, yet through the historical 
period wholesale price of cheese has changed to retain a stable relationship as suggested by the first 
Acronym 
DMC 
DPME 
DBS lND 
DBS 
DMBS 
DMY 
DCPRET 
DBC 
DMS 
DCC 
DNC 
DMFSD 
DMFLD 
DLFAT 
DBS_LF 
DWFAT 
DNS 
CDPWH 
MIPON 
MKPREH 
MFPREH 
DBPRET 
DNPRET 
DMCS 
DMIS 
DCS 
DBSK 
DNSK 
DCSK 
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Table 2. Definitions of variables used in the empirical estimation 
Definition 
Endogenous 
Cow numbers 
Industrial milk price 
Butter from industrial milk 
Total butter supply 
Industrial milk used in butter production 
Milk yields 
Cheese retail price 
Butter consumption 
Total milk supply 
Cheese consumption 
NFD consumption 
Standard fluid milk consumption 
Low fat fluid milk consumption 
Fat content of low fat milk 
Butter from fluid milk 
Fat content of whole milk 
NFD production 
Cheese wholesale price 
Fluid milk price (farm level) 
Standard fluid milk retail price 
Low fat fluid milk retail price 
Butter retail price 
NFD retail price 
Industrial milk used in cheese production 
Industrial milk supply 
Cheese production 
Butter ending stocks 
NFD ending stocks 
Cheese ending stocks 
Acronym 
GDP 
BNRATIO 
TRENDS! 
MDGTR 
DIRPAY 
BUGSP 
CMK_B 
MNGSP 
CMK_N 
CMK_C 
OTHCRMRT 
DMOTH 
DCX 
POP 
STERPRUS 
EXCH 
CPI 
SHFT82 
CORNPRUS 
Definition 
Exogenous 
Gross domestic product 
Butter/NFD price ratio 
Dummy variable for 1981 onwards 
Target milk price 
Direct payment reed. by farmers 
Butter support price 
Milk·to-butter conversion factor 
NFD support price 
Milk-to-NFD conversion factor 
Milk-to·cheese conversion factor 
Other supplies of cream etc. 
Industrial milk used in other products 
Specialty cheese imports 
Population 
U.S. Steer price 
Exchange rate (C$/US$) 
Consumer price index 
Dummy variables for 1982 onwards 
U.S. com price 
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Table 3. Results of log-linear model estimation for the Canadian dairy sector 
l. LOG(DMC)-0.155+ l.OlLOG( DMC,.,)+0.025LOG(DPME'lOO/CPI) -0.071LOG(STERPRUS'EXCH '100/CPI) 
(0.66) (25.8) (2.38) (-2.34) 
2. LOG(DMY)~-1.086+0.139'SHFT82+0.598LOG(DMY,., )+O.l22(DPME/(CORNPRUS'EXCH)) -2.105 LOG (DMC/DMC,_,) 
(-1.8) (2.79) (1.94) (-3.13) 
3. DMS~DMC'DMY 
4. BNRATIO ~ 0.264-0.002' TRENDS!+ 0.845 'BNRATIO,., 
() (-0.99) (120.47) 
5. LOG(MDGTR-DIRPAY) ~LOG (0.825) + 1.004' LOG(BUGSP'CMK_B+MNGSP'CMK_N) 
(89.53) (344.92) 
6. LOG(CDPWH'CMK_C) ~ LOG(l.257) + 1.029 LOG(MDGTR-DIRPA Y) 
(70.73) (266.44) 
7. LOG(MIPON) ~ LOG(0.745) + 1.108 LOG(MDGTR) 
(6.28) (26.48) 
8. LOG(MKPREH'IOO) ~LOG (0.457) + 1.381 LOG (MIPON) 
(7.32) (39.65) 
9. LOG(MFPREH+(BUGSP'(3.25-l.74)/100) ~ LOG(I.073) + 0.705 (MKPREH) 
(187.78) (20.00) 
10. BNRA110 ~ BUGSP/MNGSP 
II. LOG(DBPREn- LGG(0.798) + 1.205 LOG(BUGSP) 
(26.17) (45.28) 
12. LOG(DNPREn ~ LOG(l.25) + 1.61 LOG(MNGSP) 
(9.95) (15.04) 
13. LOG(DCPREn ~ LOG(O. 705) + 1.532 LOG(CDPWH) 
(11.28) (25.09) 
14. LOG(DBC/POP) ~ (-1.013 + 2.111)- 0.551 LOG(DBPRET'100/CPI) +1.277 LOG(GDP/POP) + (-0.125- 0.925)LOG(YEAR-1974) 
((-1.59) (5.81)) (-1.34) (5.25) (( -4.78) (-6.09)) 
15. LOG (DCC/POP)~ (-0.02 + 0.428)- 0.524 LOG(DCPRET'IOO/CPI) + 0.991 LOG(GDP/POP) + (0.132- 0.136) LOG (YEAR-1974) 
((-0.02) (2.20)) (-1.46) (4.39) ((3.52) (-2.05)) 
16. LOG(DNC/POP)~8. 90+ 7.80)-7. 737LOG(DNPRET'I 00/CPI)-4.11 3LOG(MIP0N'I 00/CPI)+ 3.52(LOG(GDP/POP)+( -0.228-3.394) 
(0.29+0.83) (-0.38) (-0.44) (0.73) (-0.19-0.78) 
LOG (YEAR-1974) 
17. LOG(DMFSD/POP) ~ -1.188-4.338 LOG(MKPREHIMFPREH) 
(-39.6) (-8.21) 
18. LOG(DMFLD/POP) ~ -0.788 -0.187 LOG(MFPREH'100/CPI) + 0.177 LOG(YEAR-1972) 
(-17.45) (-2.06) (9.83) 
19. DLFAT ~ 0.017 + 0.0004 (YEAR-1972)- 0.00002 (YEAR-1972)' 
(51.95) (6.12) (-7.64) 
20. DBS_LF ~ (CMK _B/(DWFAT/IOO))'(DWFAT/100-DLFAT)'DMFLD'(1-0THCRMRn 
21. DBS_IND~DBS-DBS_LF 
22. DMBS ~ DBS_IND I CMK_B 
23. DNS ~ 0.750 (CMK_N' DMBS) 
(47.68) 
24. DMCS ~ DMIS- DMBS- DMOTH 
25. DCS=CMK_C*DMCS 
26. DCX ~ -12.095 + 0.087 DCC 
(-3.20) (5.47) 
27. DBSK ~ 44.222- 13.675 LOG (DBPSUP) 
(1.63) -(0.79) 
28. DNSK ~ 86.805 - 56.893 LOG (DNPSUP) 
(3.72) (-2.59) 
29. DCSK ~ 92.627-28.205 LOG (DCPWH) 
(8.02) (-3.88) 
Per unit levy on 
excess output= $L 
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Figure 5. Dairy policy outcome in Canada 
order conditions of profit maximization. Thus independent support prices for each of the above three 
products is neither necessary nor sustainable. The U.S. announces support prices for all three products, 
and the cheese to butter cum NFD revenue ratios have been more volatile than Canada in the short-run. 
The second implication is that a set target price for milk can be achieved through an infinite number of 
combinations of butter and NFD prices. 
This concept of fine-tuning is illustrated in figure 6. The four quadrants represent price and 
quantity relationships between butter and NFD. The upper right quadrant relates the two prices. The 
downward sloping straight line aa' represents an iso-revenue line tracing all possible combinations of 
butter and NFD prices that provide a given level of returns per unit of milk used in manufacturing the 
joint-products. The opposite quadrant (lower-left) relates the quantity relationship between butter and 
NFD in production. The technical relationship between the two joint products are thus traced by a ray 
through the origin. The other two quadrants relate the price-quantity relationship of each of the products, 
respectively. The curves and dNrn represent the demand for the respective good. The line aa' thus 
represents all combinations of support prices for butter and NFD consistent with a specific target price 
for milk (PT, less manufacturing margin) as in the case of Canada. Say, the government chooses the 
16 
price combination b1n1 to maintain this target price ofPr. Self-sufficiency in butter is achieved with B1 
level of butter production at Price b1• At this level of butter production, supply of the joint product, NFD, 
is at S1 while demand is at D~o resulting in a surplus ofNFD. It can be similarly shown that, moving to 
b2n2 combination of support prices and producing butter to meet self-sufficiency, results in no change in 
target price level for milk but causes a deficit in NFD. Thus, there is a combination of support prices 
between the b1n1 and b2n2 combinations that would provide self-sufficiency in both commodities, and 
still be consistent with the given target price of milk. 
In the Canadian policy mix, a particular price relationship between the joint products- butter 
and NFD- was predetermined, and as the target price of milk was revised upwards over time, both 
NFD and butter prices were proportionally increased (the 50:50 rule) to achieve the target price. Only in 
1993-94 was the rule modified to 60:40 in favor ofNFD with the goal to reduce the incentive for butter 
production in order to decrease NFD surpluses. It is also suggested here that various combinations of 
butter and NFD prices exist that are consistent with any specific target price for milk, and among these, 
there exists a unique combination that is consistent with exact and simultaneous self-sufficiency in both 
butter and NFD. The estimated structural coefficients can be used to fine-tune production-consumption 
levels, in accord with domestic and trade policies. 
,4,_ 
' ~t-f' 
b, ' "% 
'~,l\, 
QB,~--~ri-----~----~-+---r--~pmu 
].·············/ f-----M-, NFD 
.· 
Techni~al 
ratio 
QNFD 
Figure 6: Fine-tuning support prices for simultaneous self-sufficiency in butter and NFD 
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In this regard, we wish to make note of the likely impact of this recent rule change in NFD and 
butter price setting. Relative strengthening ofNFD price relative to butter price by substituting 60:40 
rule for the 50:50 rule will theoretically leave processing revenue in the butter industry and hence, the 
quantity of milk entering butter processing unchanged. Relatively lower priced butter (lower than if 
50:50 rule were applied) will result in self-sufficiency at a higher level, increased milk use for butter, and 
even higher surplus of the relatively higher priced NFD. 
18 
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